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In 1909, Ernest Rutherford, Hans Geiger and Ernest Marsden took a piece of radium and used 
it to fire charged particles at a sheet of gold foil. They wanted to test the then-dominant 
theory that atoms were simply clusters of electrons floating in little seas of positive electrical 
charge (the so-called ‘plum pudding’ model). What came next, said Rutherford, was ‘the 
most incredible event that has ever happened to me in my life’. 
Despite the airy thinness of the foil, a small fraction of the particles bounced straight back at 
the source – a result, Rutherford noted, ‘as incredible as if you fired a 15-inch shell at a piece 
of tissue paper and it came back and hit you’. Instead of whooshing straight through the thin 
soup of electrons that should have been all that hovered in their path, the particles had 
encountered something solid enough to push back. Something was wrong with matter. 
Somewhere, reality had departed from the best available model. But where? 
The first big insight came from Rutherford himself. He realised that, if the structure of the 
atom were to permit collisions of the magnitude that his team had observed, its mass must be 
concentrated in a central nucleus, with electrons whirling around it. Could such a structure be 
stable? Why didn’t the electrons just spiral into the centre, leaking electromagnetic radiation 
as they fell? 
Such concerns prompted the Danish physicist Niels Bohr to formulate a rather oddly rigid 
model of the atom, using artificial-seeming rules about electron orbits and energy levels to 
keep everything in order. It was ugly but it seemed to work. Then, in 1924, a French 
aristocrat and physicist named Louis de Broglie argued [1] that Bohr’s model would make 
more sense if we assumed that the electrons orbiting the atomic nucleus (and indeed 
everything else that had hitherto been considered a particle) either came with, or in some 
sense could behave like, waves. 
If Bohr’s atom had seemed a little arbitrary, de Broglie’s improved version was almost 
incomprehensible. Physical theory might have recovered some grip on reality but it seemed to 
have decisively parted company from common sense. And yet, as Albert Einstein said on 
reading de Broglie’s thesis, here was ‘the first feeble ray of light on this worst of our physics 
enigmas’. By 1926, these disparate intuitions and partial models were already unified into a 
new mathematical theory called quantum mechanics. Within a few years, the implications for 
chemistry, spectroscopy and nuclear physics were being confirmed. 
It was clear from the start that quantum theory challenged all our previous preconceptions 
about the nature of matter and how it behaves, and indeed about what science can possibly – 
even in principle – say about these questions. Over the years, this very slipperiness has made 
it irresistible to hucksters of various descriptions. I regularly receive ads offering to teach me 
how to make quantum jumps into alternate universes, tap into my infinite quantum self-
energy, and make other exciting-sounding excursions from the plane of reason and meaning. 
It’s worth stressing, then, that the theory itself is both mathematically precise and extremely 
well confirmed by experiment. 
Quantum mechanics has correctly predicted the outcomes of a vast range of investigations, 
from the scattering of X-rays by crystals to the discovery of the Higgs boson at the Large 
Hadron Collider. It successfully explains a vast range of natural phenomena, including the 
structure of atoms and molecules, nuclear fission and fusion, the way light interacts with 
matter, how stars evolve and shine, and how the elements forming the world around us were 
originally created. 
Yet it puzzled many of its founders, including Einstein and Erwin Schrödinger, and it 
continues to puzzle physicists today. Einstein in particular never quite accepted it. ‘It seems 
hard to sneak a look at God’s cards,’ he wrote to a colleague, ‘but that he plays dice and uses 
“telepathic” methods (as the present quantum theory requires of him) is something that I 
cannot believe for a single moment.’ In a 1935 paper [2] co-written with Boris Podolsky and 
Nathan Rosen, Einstein asked: ‘Can [the] Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical 
Reality Be Considered Complete?’ He concluded that it could not. Given apparently sensible 
demands on what a description of physical reality must entail, it seemed that something must 
be missing. We needed a deeper theory to understand physical reality fully. 
Einstein never found the deeper theory he sought. Indeed, later theoretical work by the Irish 
physicist John Bell [3] and subsequent experiments suggested that the apparently reasonable 
demands of that 1935 paper could never be satisfied. Had Einstein lived to see this work, he 
would surely have agreed that his own search for a deeper theory of reality needed to follow a 
different path from the one he sketched in 1935. 
Even so, I believe that Einstein would have remained convinced that a deeper theory was 
needed. None of the ways we have so far found of looking at quantum theory are entirely 
believable. In fact, it’s worse than that. To be ruthlessly honest, none of them even quite 
makes sense. But that might be about to change. 
Here’s the basic problem. While the mathematics of quantum theory works very well in 
telling us what to expect at the end of an experiment, it seems peculiarly conceptually 
confusing when we try to understand what was happening during the experiment. To 
calculate what outcomes we might expect when we fire protons at one another in the Large 
Hadron Collider, we need to analyse what – at first sight – look like many different stories. 
The same final set of particles detected after a collision might have been generated by lots of 
different possible sequences of energy exchanges involving lots of different possible 
collections of particles. We can’t tell which particles were involved from the final set of 
detected particles. 
Now, if the trouble was only that we have a list of possible ways that things could have gone 
in a given experiment and we can’t tell which way they actually went just by looking at the 
results, that wouldn’t be so puzzling. If you find some flowers at your front door and you’re 
not sure which of your friends left them there, you don’t start worrying that there are 
inconsistencies in your understanding of physical reality. You just reason that, of all the 
people who could have brought them, one of them presumably did. You don’t have a logical 
or conceptual problem, just a patchy record of events. 
Quantum theory isn’t like this, as far as we presently understand it. We don’t get a list of 
possible explanations for what happened, of which one (although we don’t know which) must 
be the correct one. We get a mathematical recipe that tells us to combine, in an elegant but 
conceptually mysterious way, numbers attached to each possible explanation. Then we use 
the result of this calculation to work out the likelihood of any given final result. But here’s 
the twist. Unlike the mathematical theory of probability, this quantum recipe requires us to 
make different possible stories cancel each other out, or fully or partially reinforce each other. 
This means that the net chance of an outcome arising from several possible stories can be 
more or less than the sum of the chances associated with each. 
To get a sense of the conceptual mystery we face here, imagine you have three friends, John, 
Mary and Jo, who absolutely never talk to each other or interact in any other way. If any one 
of them is in town, there’s a one-in-four chance that this person will bring you flowers on any 
given day. (They’re generous and affectionate friends. They’re also entirely random and 
spontaneous – nothing about the particular choice of day affects the chance they might bring 
you flowers.) But if John and Mary are both in town, you know there’s no chance you’ll get 
any flowers that day – even though they never interact, so neither of them should have any 
idea whether the other one is around. And if Mary and Jo are both in town, you’ll certainly 
get exactly one bunch of flowers – again, even though Mary and Jo never interact either, and 
you’d have thought that if they’re acting independently, your chance of getting any flowers is 
a bit less than a half, while once in a while you should get two bunches. 
If you think this doesn’t make any sense, that there has to be something missing from this 
flower delivery fable, well, that’s how many thoughtful physicists feel about quantum theory 
and our understanding of nature. Pretty precisely analogous things happen in quantum 
experiments. 
One attempt to make sense of this situation – the so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of 
quantum theory, versions of which were advocated by Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and other 
leading quantum theorists in the first half of the last century – claims that quantum theory is 
teaching us something profound and final about the limits of what science can tell us. 
According to this approach, a scientific question makes sense only if we have a direct way of 
verifying the answer. So, asking what we’ll see in our particle detectors is a scientific 
question; asking what happened in the experiment before anything registered in our detectors 
isn’t, because we weren’t looking. To be looking, we’d have had to put detectors in the 
middle of the experiment, and then it would have been a different experiment. In trying to 
highlight the absurd-seeming consequences of this view, Schrödinger minted what has 
become its best-known popular icon – an imaginary experiment with a sealed box containing 
a cat that is simultaneously alive and dead, only resolving into one or other definite state 
when an experimenter opens the box. 
The Copenhagen interpretation was very much in line with the scientific philosophy of 
logical positivism that caught on at around the same time. In particular, it rests on something 
like logical positivism’s principle of verification, according to which a scientific statement is 
meaningful only if we have some means of verifying its truth. To some of the founders of 
quantum theory, as well as to later adherents of the Copenhagen interpretation, this came to 
seem an almost self-evident description of the scientific process. Even after philosophers 
largely abandoned logical positivism – not least because the principle of verification fails its 
own test for meaningful statements – many physicists trained in the Copenhagen tradition 
insisted that their stance was no more than common sense. 
However, its consequences are far from commonsensical. If you take this position seriously, 
then you have to accept that the Higgs boson wasn’t actually discovered at the Large Hadron 
Collider, since no one has ever directly detected a Higgs boson, and we have no direct 
evidence to support the claim that the Higgs boson is a real particle. Insofar as we learnt 
anything about nature from the Large Hadron Collider, it was merely what sort of records you 
get in your detectors when you build something like the Large Hadron Collider. It’s hard to 
imagine the scientists who work on it, or the citizens who funded them, being very 
enthusiastic about this justification, but on a strict Copenhagen view it’s the best we can do. 
It gets worse. Quantum theory is supposed to describe the behaviour of elementary particles, 
atoms, molecules and every other form of matter in the universe. This includes us, our planet 
and, of course, the Large Hadron Collider. In that sense, everything since the Big Bang has 
been one giant quantum experiment, in which all the particles in the universe, including those 
we think of as making up the Earth and our own bodies, are involved. But if theory tells us 
we’re among the sets of particles involved a giant quantum experiment, the position I’ve just 
outlined tells us we can’t justify any statement about what has happened or is happening until 
the experiment is over. Only at the end, when we might perhaps imagine some 
technologically advanced alien experimenters in the future looking at the final state of the 
universe, can any meaningful statement be made. 
Of course, this final observation will never happen. By definition, no one is sitting outside the 
universe waiting to observe the final outcome at the end of time. And even if the idea of 
observers waiting outside the universe made sense – which it doesn’t – on this view their 
final observations still wouldn’t allow them to say anything about what happened between the 
Big Bang and the end of time. We end up concluding that quantum theory doesn’t allow us to 
justify making any scientific statement at all about the past, present or future. Our most 
fundamental scientific theory turns out to be a threat to the whole enterprise of science. For 
these and related reasons, the Copenhagen interpretation gradually fell out of general favour. 
Its great rival was first set out in a 1957 paper [7] and Princeton PhD thesis written by one of 
the stranger figures in the history of 20th-century physics, Hugh Everett III. Rather 
unromantically, and very unusually for a highly original thinker and talented physicist, 
Everett abandoned theoretical physics after he had published his big idea. A good deal of his 
subsequent career was spent in military consultancy, advising the US on strategies for 
fighting and ‘winning’ a nuclear war against the USSR, and the bleakness of this chosen path 
presumably contributed to his chain-smoking, alcoholism and depression. Everett died of a 
heart attack at the age of 51; possibly we can infer something of his own ultimate assessment 
of his life’s worth from the fact that he instructed his wife to throw his ashes in the trash. And 
yet, despite his detachment from academic life (some might say from all of life), Everett’s 
PhD work eventually became enormously influential. 
One way of thinking about his ideas on quantum theory is that our difficulties in getting a 
description of quantum reality arise from a tension between the mathematics – which, as we 
have seen, tells us to make calculations involving many different possible stories about what 
might have really happened – and the apparently incontrovertible fact that, at the end of an 
experiment, we see that only one thing actually did happen. This led Everett to ask a question 
that seems at first sight stupid, but which turns out to be very deep: how do we know that we 
only get one outcome to a quantum experiment? What if we take the hint from the 
mathematics and consider a picture of reality in which many different things actually do 
happen – everything, in fact, that quantum theory allows? And what if we take this to its 
logical conclusion and accept the same view of cosmology, so that all the different possible 
histories of the evolution of the universe are realised? We end up, Everett argued, with what 
became known as a ‘many worlds’ picture of reality, one in which it is constantly forming 
new branches describing alternative – but equally real – future continuations of the same 
present state. 
On this view, every time any of us does a quantum experiment with several possible 
outcomes, all those outcomes are enacted in different branches of reality, each of which 
contains a copy of our self whose memories are identical up to the start of experiment, but 
each of whom sees different results. None of these future selves has any special claim to be 
the real one. They are all equally real – genuine but distinct successors of the person who 
started the experiment. The same picture holds true more generally in cosmology: alongside 
the reality we currently habit, there are many others in which the history of the universe and 
our planet was ever so slightly different, many more in which humanity exists on Earth but 
the course of human history was significantly different from ours, and many more still in 
which nothing resembling Earth or its inhabitants can be found. 
This might sound like unbelievable science fiction. To such a gibe, Everett and his followers 
would reply that science has taught us many things that seemed incredible at first. Other 
critics object that the ‘many worlds’ scenario seems like an absurdly extravagant and 
inelegant hypothesis. Trying to explain the appearance of one visible reality by positing an 
infinite collection of invisible ones might seem the most deserving candidate in the history of 
science for a sharp encounter with Occam’s razor. But to this, too, Everettians have an 
answer: given the mathematics of quantum theory, on which everyone agrees, their proposal 
is actually the simplest option. The many worlds are there in the equations. To eliminate them 
you have to add something new, or else change them – and we don’t have any experimental 
evidence telling us that something should be added or that the equations need changing. 
Everettians might have a point, then, when they argue that their ideas deserve a hearing. The 
problem is that, from Everett and his early followers onwards, they have never managed to 
agree on a clear story about how exactly this picture of branching worlds is supposed to 
emerge from the fundamental equations of quantum theory, and how this single world that we 
see, with experimental outcomes that are apparently random but which follow definite 
statistical laws, might then be explained. One of the blackly funny revelations in Peter 
Byrne’s biography The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III (2010) [8] was the discovery of 
Everett’s personal copy of the classic text The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics[9], put together in 1973 by the distinguished American physicist Bryce DeWitt 
and a few of Everett’s other early supporters. To DeWitt’s mild criticism that ‘Everett’s 
original derivation [of probabilities]… is rather too brief to be entirely satisfying’, Everett 
scribbled in the margins ‘Only to you!’ and ‘Goddamit [sic] you don’t see it’. On another 
paper addressing the same issue, his comment was the single word ‘bullshit’. Although 
generally in more civil terms, Everettians have continued to argue over this and related points 
ever since. 
Indeed, the big unresolved, and seemingly unsolvable, problem here is how statistical laws 
can possibly emerge at all when the Everettian meta-picture of branching worlds has no 
randomness in it. If we do an experiment with an uncertain outcome, Everett’s proposal says 
that everything that could possibly happen (including the very unlikely outcomes) will in fact 
take place. It’s possible that Everettians can sketch some explanation of why it seems to ‘us’ 
(really, to any one of our many future successors) that ‘we’ see only one outcome. But that 
only replaces ‘everything will actually happen’ with ‘anything could seem to happen to us’ – 
which is still neither a quantitative nor a falsifiable scientific statement. To do science, we 
need to able to test statements such as ‘there’s a one-in-three chance X will happen to us’ and 
‘it’s incredibly unlikely that Y will happen to us’ – but it isn’t at all obvious that Everett’s 
ideas support any such statements. 
Everettians continue to devote much ingenuity to deriving statements involving probabilities 
from the underlying deterministic many-worlds picture. One idea lately advocated by David 
Deutsch and David Wallace of the University of Oxford is to try to use decision theory, the 
area of mathematics that concerns rational decision-making, to explain how rational people 
should behave if they believe they are in a branching universe. Deutsch and Wallace start 
from a few purportedly simple and natural technical assumptions about the preferences one 
should have in a branching world and then claim to show that rational Everettians should 
behave as though they were in an uncertain probabilistic world following the statistical laws 
of quantum theory, even though they believe their true situation is very different. 
One problem with this line of thought is that the assumptions turn out not to seem especially 
natural, or even properly defined, on close inspection. The easiest way to understand this is to 
look for rationally defensible strategies for life in a branching universe other than the ones 
Deutsch and Wallace advocate. One example I rather like (because it makes the point 
succinctly, not because it seems morally attractive) is that of future self elitism, which 
counsels us to focus only on the welfare of our most fortunate and successful future 
successor, perhaps on the premise that our best possible future self is our truest self. Future 
self elitists don’t worry about the odds of a particular bet, only about the best possible payoff. 
Thus they violate Deutsch and Wallace’s axioms, but it is hard to see any purely logical 
argument against their decisions. 
Another issue is that, as several critics have pointed out, whatever one thinks of Deutsch and 
Wallace’s proposed rational strategy, it answers a subtly different question to the one that 
Everettians were supposed to be addressing. The question ‘What bets should I be happy to 
place on the outcomes of a given experiment, given that I believe in Everettian many-
worlds?’ is certainly a question that relates something we normally try to answer using 
probabilities with the many-worlds picture. In that sense, it makes some sort of connection 
between probabilities and many worlds – and since we’ve seen how hard that is to achieve, 
it’s easy to understand why Everettians (at least initially) are enthusiastic about this 
accomplishment. But, unfortunately, it’s not the sort of connection we need. The key 
scientific question is why the experimental evidence for quantum theory justifies a belief in 
many worlds in the first place. Many Everettians – from Everett and DeWitt onwards – have 
tried to give a satisfactory answer to this. Many critics (myself included) appreciate the 
cunning of their attempts but think they have all failed. 
If we cannot get a coherent story about physical reality from the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum theory and we cannot get a scientifically adequate one from many-worlds theory, 
where do we turn? We could, as some physicists suggest, simply give up on the hope of 
finding any description of an objective external reality. But it is very hard to see how to do 
this without also giving up on science. The hypothesis that our universe began from 
something like a Big Bang, our account of the evolution of galaxies and stars, the formation 
of the elements and of planets and all of chemistry, biology, physics, archaeology, 
palaeontology and indeed human history – all rely on propositions about real observer-
independent facts and events. Once we assume the existence of an external world that 
changes over time, these interrelated propositions form a logically coherent set; chemistry 
depends on cosmology, evolution on chemistry, history on evolution and so on. Without that 
assumption, it is very hard to see how one might make sense of any of these disciplines, let 
alone see a unifying picture that underlies them all and explains their deep interrelations and 
mutual dependence. 
If we can’t allow the statement that dinosaurs really walked the Earth, what meaningful 
content could biology, palaeontology or Darwinian evolution actually have? It’s even harder 
to understand why the statement seems to give such a concise explanation of many things 
we’ve noticed about the world, from the fossil record to (we think) the present existence of 
birds, if it’s actually just a meaningless fiction. Similarly, if we can’t say that water molecules 
really contain one oxygen and two hydrogen atoms – or at least that something about reality 
that supports this model – then what, if anything, is chemistry telling us? 
Physics poses many puzzles, and the focus of the physics community shifts over time. Most 
theoretical physicists today do not work on this question about what really happens in 
quantum experiments. Among those who think about it at all, many hope that we can find a 
way of thinking about quantum theory in which reality somehow evaporates or never arises. 
That seems like wishful thinking to me. 
The alternative, as John Bell recognised earlier and more clearly than almost all of his 
contemporaries, is to accept that quantum theory cannot be a complete fundamental theory of 
nature. (As mentioned above, Einstein also believed this, though at least partly because of 
arguments that Bell was instrumental in refuting.) 
Bell was one of the last century’s deepest thinkers about science. As he put it, quantum 
theory ‘carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction’: it undermines the account of reality 
that it needs in order to make any sense as a physical theory. On this view, which was once as 
close to heresy as a scientific argument can be but is now widely held among scientists who 
work on the foundations of physics, the reality problem is just not solvable within quantum 
theory as it stands. And so, along with the variables that describe potentialities and 
possibilities, we need to supplement our quantum equations with quantities that correspond 
directly to real events or things – real ‘stuff’ in the world. 
Bell coined the term beables to refer to these elusive missing ingredients. ‘Beable’ is an ugly 
word but a useful concept. It denotes variables that are able to ‘be’ in the world – hence the 
name. And indeed it turns out that we can extend quantum theory to include beables that 
would directly describe the sort of reality we actually see. Some of the most interesting work 
in fundamental physics in the past few decades has been in the search for new theories that 
agree with quantum theory in its predictions to date, but which include a beable description of 
reality, and so give us a profoundly different fundamental picture of the world. 
What sort of quantities might do the trick? One early idea comes from Louis de Broglie, 
whom we met earlier, and David Bohm, an American theoretical physicist who fled 
McCarthyite persecution and spent most of his career at the University of London. The 
essence of their proposal is that, in addition to the mathematical quantities given to us by 
quantum theory, we also have equations defining a definite path through space and time for 
each elementary particle in nature. These paths are determined by the initial state of the 
universe and, in this sense, de Broglie-Bohm theory [4] can be thought of as a deterministic 
theory, rather like the pre-quantum theories given by Newton’s and Maxwell’s equations. 
Unfortunately, de Broglie and Bohm’s equations also share another property of Newton’s 
equations: an action at any point in space has instantaneous effects on particles at arbitrarily 
distant points. 
Because these effects would not be directly detectable, this would not actually allow us to 
send signals faster than light, and so it does not lead to observations that contradict Einstein’s 
special theory of relativity. It does, however, very much violate its spirit, as well as the 
beautiful symmetry principles incorporated in the underlying mathematics. For this reason, 
and also because de Broglie and Bohm’s ideas work well for particles but are hard to 
generalise to electromagnetic and other fields, it seems impossible to find a version of the 
scheme that is consistent with much of modern theoretical physics. Still, de Broglie and 
Bohm’s great achievement was to show that we can find a mathematically consistent 
description of reality alongside quantum theory. When it first emerged, their work was 
largely unappreciated, but it led to many of Bell’s insights into the quantum reality problem 
and blazed a trail for later theorists. 
In the 1980s, a much more promising avenue opened up, thanks to the efforts of Giancarlo 
Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, Tullio Weber and Philip Pearle [6,7], three European theorists and 
an American. Their approach became known as the ‘spontaneous collapse’ model and their 
brilliant insight was that we can find mathematical laws that describe how the innumerable 
possible outcomes encoded in a quantum description of an experiment get reduced to the one 
actual result that we see. As we have already noted, the tension between these two 
descriptions is at the heart of the quantum reality problem. 
When using standard quantum theory, physicists often say that the wave function – a 
mathematical object that encodes all the potential possibilities – ‘collapses’ to the measured 
outcome at the end of an experiment. This ‘collapse’, though, is no more than a figure of 
speech, which only highlights the awkward fact that we do not understand what is really 
happening. By contrast, in Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber-Pearle models, collapse becomes a well-
defined mathematical and physical process, taking place at definite points in space, following 
precise equations and going on all the time in the world around us, whether or not we are 
making measurements. According to these new equations, the more particles there are in a 
physical system, the faster the collapse rate. Left isolated, a single electron will collapse so 
rarely that we essentially never see any effect. On the other hand, anything large enough to be 
visible – even a dust grain – has enough particles in it that it collapses very quickly compared 
to human perception times. (In Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment, the cat’s quantum 
state would resolve in next to no time, leaving us with either a live cat or a dead one, not 
some strange quantum combination of both.) 
One way of thinking about reality in these models, first suggested by Bell [10], is to take the 
beables to be the points in space and time at which the collapses take place. On this view, a 
dust grain is actually a little galaxy of collapse points, winking instantaneously in and out of 
existence within or near to (what we normally think of as) the small region of space that it 
occupies. Everything else we see around us, including our selves, has the same sort of 
pointillistic character. 
Collapse models do not make exactly the same predictions as quantum theory, which could 
turn out to be either a strength or a weakness. Since quantum theory is very well confirmed, 
this disagreement might seem to rule these new models out. However, the exact rate of 
collapses per particle is a free parameter that is not fixed by the mathematics of the basic 
proposal. It is perfectly possible to tailor this value such that the differences between collapse 
model predictions and those of quantum theory are so tiny that no experiment to date would 
have detected it, and at the same time large enough that the models give a satisfactory 
solution to the reality problem (ie, everything that seems definite and real to us actually is 
real and definite). 
That said, we presently have no theoretically good reason why the parameter should be in the 
range that allows this explanation to work. It might seem a little conspiratorial of nature to 
give us the impression that quantum theory is correct, while tuning the equations so that the 
crucial features that give rise to a definite physical reality are – with present technology – 
essentially undetectable. On the other hand, history tells us that deep physical insights, not 
least quantum theory itself, have often come to light only when technology advances 
sufficiently. The first evidence for what turns out to be a revolutionary change in our 
understanding of nature can often be a tiny difference between what current theory predicts 
and what is observed in some crucial experiment. 
There are other theoretical problems with collapse models. Although they do not seem to 
conflict with special relativity or with field theories in the way that de Broglie-Bohm theory 
does, incorporating the collapse idea into these fundamental theories nevertheless poses 
formidable technical problems. Even on an optimistic view, the results in this direction to 
date represent work in progress rather than a fully satisfactory solution. Another worry for 
theorists in a subject where elegance seems to be a surprisingly strong indicator of physical 
relevance is that the mathematics of collapse seems a little ad hoc and utilitarian. To be fair, it 
is considerably less ugly than the de Broglie-Bohm theories, which to a purist’s eye more 
closely resemble a Heath Robinson contraption than the elegant machinery we have come to 
expect of the laws of physics. But compared with the extraordinary depth and beauty of 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity, or of quantum theory itself, collapse models 
disappoint. 
This could simply mean that we have not properly understood them, or not yet seen the 
majestic deeper theory of which they form a part. It seems likelier, though, that collapse 
models are at best only a step in roughly the right direction. I suspect that, like de Broglie-
Bohm theory, they will eventually be seen as pointers on the way to a deeper understanding 
of physical reality – extraordinarily important achievements, but not fundamentally correct 
descriptions. 
There is, however, one important lesson that we can already credit to collapse models. De 
Broglie-Bohm theory suffers from the weakness that its experimental predictions are 
precisely the same as those of quantum theory, unlike collapse models that, as we have noted, 
are at least in principle testably different. The beables in de Broglie-Bohm theory – the 
particle paths – play a rather subordinate role: their behaviour is governed by the wave 
function that characterises all the possible realities from which any given set of paths is 
drawn, but they have no effect on that wave function. In metaphysical language, the de 
Broglie-Bohm theory beables are epiphenomena. The American psychologist William James 
once critically and poetically described [11] the English biologist T H Huxley’s view of 
human consciousness as ‘Inert, uninfluential, a simple passenger in the voyage of life, it is 
allowed to remain on board, but not to touch the helm or handle the rigging’. Much the same 
might be said of a de Broglie-Bohm beable. Collapse-model beables, on the other hand, give 
as good as they get. Their appearance is governed by rules involving the quantum wave 
function, and yet, once they appear, they in turn alter the wave function. This makes for a far 
more interesting theory, mathematically as well as scientifically. 
It’s tempting to declare this as a requirement for any variable in a fundamental theory of 
physics – or at least, any variable that plays as important a role as the beables are meant to 
play: it should be mathematically active, not purely passive. Any interesting solution to the 
quantum reality problem should (like collapse models but unlike de Broglie-Bohm theory) 
make experimentally testable predictions that allow us to check our new description of 
reality. 
How might we do that? Assuming these ideas are not entirely wrong, what sort of 
experiments might give us evidence of a deeper theory underlying quantum theory and a 
better understanding of physical reality? The best answer we can give at present, if collapse 
models and other recent ideas for beable theories are any guide, is that we should expect to 
see something new when some relevant quantity in the experiment gets large. In particular, 
the peculiar and intriguing phenomenon called quantum interference – which seems to give 
direct evidence that different possible paths which could have been followed during an 
experiment all contribute to the outcome – should start to break down as we try to 
demonstrate it for larger and larger objects, or over larger and larger scales. 
This makes some intuitive sense. Quantum theory was developed to explain the behaviour of 
atoms and other small systems, and has been well tested only on small scales. It would 
always have been a brave and perhaps foolhardy extrapolation to assume that it works on all 
scales, up to and including the entire universe, even if this involved no conceptual problems. 
Given the self-contradictions involved in the extrapolation and the profound obstacles that 
seem to prevent any solution of the reality problem within standard quantum theory, the most 
natural assumption is that, like every previous theory of physics, quantum mechanics will 
turn out only approximately true, applying within a limited domain only. 
A number of experimental groups around the world are now trying to find the boundaries of 
that domain, testing quantum interference for larger and larger molecules (the current record 
is for molecules comprising around 1,000 atoms), and ultimately for small crystals and even 
viruses and other living organisms. This would also allow us to investigate the outlandish but 
not utterly inconceivable hunch that the boundaries of quantum theory have to do with the 
complexity of a system, or even with life itself, rather than just size. Researchers have 
proposed space-based experiments to test the interference between very widely separated 
beams and will no doubt spring into action once quantum technology becomes available on 
satellites, as it probably will in the next few years. 
With luck, if the ideas I have outlined are on the right lines, we might have a good chance of 
detecting the limits of quantum theory in the next decade or two. At the same time we can 
hope for some insight into the nature and structure of physical reality. Anyone who expects it 
to look like Newtonian billiard-balls bouncing around in space and time, or anything 
remotely akin to pre-quantum physical ideas, will surely be disappointed. Quantum theory 
might not be fundamentally correct, but it would not have worked so well for so long if its 
strange and beautiful mathematics did not form an important part of the deep structure of 
nature. Whatever underlies it might well seem weirder still, more remote from everyday 
human intuitions, and perhaps even richer and more challenging mathematically. To borrow a 
phrase from John Bell, trying to speculate further would only be to share my confusion. No 
one in 1899 could have dreamed of anything like quantum theory as a fundamental 
description of physics: we would never have arrived at quantum theory without compelling 
hints from a wide range of experiments. 
The best present ideas for addressing the quantum reality problem are at least as crude and 
problematic as Bohr’s model of the atom. Nature is far richer than our imaginations, and we 
will almost certainly need new experimental data to take our understanding of quantum 
reality further. If the past is any guide, it should be an extraordinarily interesting scientific 
journey. 
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